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Laws restricting child labor are among the most widespread labor regulations
today. Most countries in the world have imposed at least some form of child-
labor restriction, with outright bans under a certain age limit being the norm. For
example, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) to date 141
countries have signed ILO Convention 138, which mandates countries to specify
aminimumage ofemploymentforchildren, undernormal circumstances notless
than 15 years. Consequently, in the signing countries (which exclude the United
States) child labor as deﬁned below is illegal. Even in many countries that have
not signed the convention regulations that effectively outlaw child labor are in
place.
Given the almost universal presence of legal bans, one might expect that child
labor should have been mostly eliminated by now, leaving child labor as a topic
best studied by economic historians. In actual fact, however, child labor is alive
and well. In most empirical studies a child is deﬁned as a person below the age
of 15, and a child is said to do child labor if it is economically active, in the sense
that the child “does work on a regular basis for which he or she is remunerated
or that results in output destined for the market” (Basu 1999, p. 1085). Following
this deﬁnition, which does not include work performed by children in the non-
market sector, according to the International Labor organization (ILO) in 2000
about 190 million children between the ages of 5 to 14 worked. These children
account for about 16 percent of their cohort. Not only is child labor a common
feature of developing economies today, but it was the rule rather than the excep-
tion in Europe until the second half of the nineteenth century. Data from England
suggest that as late as 1861 more than one third of all boys from 10-14 were child
laborers, this fraction of the cohort exceeding the incidence of child labor in any
region of the world today.1
In this paper, we address the impact of child labor on a nation’s economy. Since
1As Basu (1999) points out, there are, however, single countries that feature higher rates of
child labor today than Britain had in the last century. See his article for an excellent summary
over the empirical facts concerning the incidence of child labor, both in today’s world and in
historical perspective.
1excellent surveys of the literature on child labor exist elsewhere (see especially
Basu 1999 and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 2003), we focus on a speciﬁc set of
q u e s t i o n s ,a n dw ew i l lu s eas t a n d a r dm a croeconomic modeling framework to
attempt to answer them. First, we take a positive stand and simply ask what
are the consequences of introducing child-labor legislation on the equilibrium
allocation of consumption, physical and human capital as well as education and
welfare, without addressing where this legislation came from and why it may
be desirable. In addition to investigating the effects of a direct child-labor ban
we also deduce the consequences of a mandatory education law. We frame our
analysis within a simple extension of the standard neoclassical growth model.
Our model allows for human capital investment, and we distinguish the labor
inputs by children, skilled adults, and unskilled adults.
Since our benchmark model is a representative-agent economy and the welfare
theorems hold, we come to the standard conclusion that exogenous legal restric-
tions such as child-labor laws or mandatory schooling lower welfare. This raises
the question of why child-labor laws are so popular in the real world. To make
progress on this question, in Section 3 we introduce model elements that may
lead to inefﬁcient equilibria, thus possibly providing a justiﬁcation for govern-
ment intervention. In particular, we focus on externalities in production, capi-
tal market imperfections (such as borrowing constraints and missing insurance
markets against idiosyncratic parental income risk) and conﬂicting private and
social time preference rates. With these modiﬁcations a more meaningful nor-
mative analysis of child-labor legislation can be conducted. A main result from
Section 3 is that even if there is a rationale for government intervention because
the laissez-faire equilibrium is not efﬁcient, in general there usually exist more
efﬁcient policy interventions than a child-labor ban to cure the problem.
In Section 4, we change direction and analyze the issue of child-labor legislation
from a political-economy perspective. We ask whether there might be a politi-
cally inﬂuential group that stands to gain from introducing child-labor restric-
tions, even if there is no evident normative justiﬁcation for such restrictions. We
ﬁnd that if households are heterogeneous by skill, political support for child-
labor restrictions may indeed arise. In particular, adult workers who compete
2with children in the labor market may attempt to raise their wages by banning
children from the labor market. We discuss conditions under which this motive
is sufﬁcient to explain the passing of a ban, and the extent to which the political-
economy approach can account for various real-world features of child-labor leg-
islation. Section 5 offers brief concluding remarks.
2 A Benchmark Model
In this section we construct an analytically tractable benchmark model to analyze
the effects of child-labor legislation on economic aggregates and welfare. Given
our macroeconomic perspective, the analytical framework is the standard neo-
classical growth model, extended by introducing human capital investment and
a distinction of the labor inputs by children, skilled adults, and unskilled adults.
2.1 Households
We envision a family where each member lives for two periods, being a child in
the ﬁrst period and an adult in the second period. All decisions of the family are
made by the adult members of the family. We abstract from population growth
and fertility issues for now, thus every adult has one child. Parents are altruistic
towards their children, and discount the children’s utility at discount rate β.
Let ct denote consumption of the family at date ct,a n dat+1 denote the bequests
parents at date t leave to their children. In the benchmark model we do not place
any restrictions on the sign of bequests; that is, parents can borrow against the
labor income of their children (to pay for their education, among other things).
In addition to deciding upon bequests and family consumption parents decide
whether to have their children obtain education. A child that goes to school has
to pay a resource cost φ and forgoes wages from working as a child laborer wc
t.
The beneﬁts of obtaining education are higher wages as an adult. We denote
by wu
t the wage of an adult that did not go to school and is labeled unskilled.
Adults that went to school and accumulated human capital earn a wage ws
t and
are labeled as skilled.
3In the benchmark model, in order to abstract from interesting, but analytically
difﬁcult distributional aspects of child labor and its regulation we make the as-
sumption that each household (there is a measure one of identical households) is
composed of a continuum of members of mass 1 who share consumption and be-
quests perfectly among them. Some of the households members may be skilled,
others unskilled, some children may be sent to school, others not. Let pt+1 denote
the fraction of children of the family that are sent to school in period t and p0 de-
notes the fraction of the initial cohort of adults that are skilled. Also, a0 denotes
the initial wealth of a dynasty and the real interest rate at time t is given by rt.








where the maximization is subject to:
ct + at+1 + φpt+1 = ptw
s
t +( 1− pt)w
u
t +( 1+rt)at +( 1− pt+1)w
c
t,
ct ≥ 0,p t+1 ∈ [0,1],
and a no-Ponzi-scheme condition on bequests. We assume that the period utility
function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, at least twice differentiable, and
satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
2.2 Firms
There is a representative ﬁrm in our economy that behaves competitively and op-
erates a constant returns to scale technology to produce output. The production












numbers of skilled and unskilled adult workers, as well as children hired by the
ﬁrm. The function F is homogeneous of degree one in its arguments. Further
assumptions about the complementarity or substitutability of the factors of pro-
4duction will be made as they become necessary. Physical capital depreciates at
rate δ in the production process.


























2.3 Markets, Equilibrium, and Efﬁciency
There are three spot markets that open in every period: the goods market, the
rental market for capital, and the labor market (in fact, there are separate markets
for skilled, unskilled, and child labor). We are now ready to deﬁne a competitive
equilibrium in the absence of child-labor legislation.
Deﬁnition 1 Given initial conditions {a0,p 0} a competitive equilibrium consists of al-
locations for the representative household, {ct,a t+1,p t+1}∞














t=0 the household allocationsolvesthehousehold max-
imization problem (1).
2. Given prices {rt,w s
t,w u
t ,w c
t}, the ﬁrm allocation solves the ﬁrm’s problem (2) for
every period t.
3. All markets clear:







t)=ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + φpt+1.
(b) The capital market:
Kt = at.






t =1 − pt,
N
c
t =1 − pt+1.
Below, we will frequently refer to this unconstrained equilibrium as the laissez-
faire equilibrium, to distinguish it from outcomes under restrictive child-labor
policies.
It is straightforward to deﬁne a Pareto-efﬁcient allocation:
Deﬁnition 2 Given {K0,p 0}, an allocation {ct,K t+1,p t+1}∞
t=0 is feasible if it satisﬁes
F(Kt,p t,1 − pt,1 − pt+1)=ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + φpt+1
and ct ≥ 0, pt+1 ∈ [0,1], Kt+1 ≥ 0.
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation is Pareto efﬁcientif it is feasible and there is no other feasible
allocation that gives strictly higher lifetime utility to the representative household.
Without proof, we state versions of the ﬁrst and second welfare theorems for our
environment.
Proposition 1 Let {ct,K t+1,p t+1}∞
t=0 be (part of) a competitive equilibrium allocation.
Then {ct,K t+1,p t+1}∞
t=0 is Pareto efﬁcient.
Proposition 2 Suppose that an allocation {ct,K t+1,p t+1}∞










F(Kt,p t,1 − pt,1 − pt+1)=ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt + φpt+1.
2It is straightforward to show that an allocation is Pareto efﬁcient if and only if it solves the
social planner problem is our model. Also, since there is a representative family in our model, an
efﬁcient allocation can be supported by a competitive equilibrium without transfers.




t=0 such that the allocation together with these
prices form a competitive equilibrium.
These theorems imply that in our representative-agent benchmark economy any
form of child-labor legislation cannot have beneﬁcial welfare consequences. In
the remainder of this section we will analyze the positive implications of intro-
ducing child-labor legislation.
2.4 Characterization of the Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing optimal (and thus equilibrium) alloca-







λt = λt+1 [1 − δ + FK(t +1 ) ],
λt [φ + FNc(t)] = λt+1 [FNs(t +1 )− FNu(t +1 ) ]+λtξt − λtνt.
Here FK(t +1 )denotes the partial derivative of the production function with
respect to K, evaluated at inputs in period t +1 .T h e t e r m sFNc(t), FNs(t +1 ) ,
FNu(t+1)are interpreted analogously. The Lagrange multipliers ξt and νt (which
are scaled by λt) are associated with the constraints pt+1 ≥ 0 and pt+1 ≤ 1 and
satisfy complementary slackness conditions:
ξtpt+1 =0 ,




 (ct+1)[1− δ + FK(t +1 ) ], (3)
u
 (ct)[φ + FNc(t)] = βu
 (ct+1)[FNs(t +1 )− FNu(t +1 ) ]+u
 (ct)[ξt − νt] (4)
3For consumption this is guaranteed by the Inada condition. Below we will make additional
assumptions to guarantee interiority with respect to capital Kt+1 as well.
7and thus:
φ + FNc(t)=
FNs(t +1 )− FNu(t +1 )
[1 − δ + FK(t +1 ) ]
+ ξt − νt. (5)
This condition states that at an interior solution for pt+1 the opportunity cost of
educating the marginal child today (composed of the direct resource cost φ and
forgone child-labor income, the child’s wage in the decentralization) has to equal
the discounted beneﬁts of education, equal to the increase in production due to
one more skilled worker (the skill wage premium in the decentralization).4
The Euler equations (3) and the optimal allocation condition on children’s time
use (5), together with the resource constraints and the initial conditions (K0,p 0)
as well as the transversality condition for capital pin down the optimal (and thus
equilibrium) allocation {ct,K t+1,p t+1}∞
t=0. Equilibrium interest rates and wages
are given by the marginal products of capital and the various labor inputs.
In the remainder of this section we assume that the following separability condi-











and f is homogeneous of degree one in {K,L}. Furthermore, f has positive but strictly
decreasing marginal products and satisﬁes the Inada conditions. The function g is homo-
geneous of degree 1 in its arguments (which assures that F is homogeneous of degree 1
in its arguments).
This assumption immediately implies that FK = fK is homogeneous of degree 0,
so that the marginal product of capital fK only depends on the capital-labor ratio
4In the market economy, these conditions therefore read as







+ ξt − νt.
8k = K







t)=g(pt,1 − pt,1 − pt+1).
Equations (3) and (5) then become:
u
 (ct)=βu
 (ct+1)(1 − δ + fK(kt+1)), (6)
φ + fL(kt)gNc(t)=
fL(kt+1)[gNs(t +1 )− gNu(t +1 ) ]
(1 − δ + fK(kt+1))
+ ξt − νt. (7)
Let β = 1
1+ρ,w h e r eρ is the time discount rate. The equations characterizing a
steady state (c ,k  ,p  ) are given by:5
δ + ρ = fK(k
 ),
1+ρ =
fL(k )[gNs( ) − gNu( )] + (1 + ρ)(ξ  − ν )
φ + fL(k )gNc( )
,
c
  = F(K
 ,L
 ) − δK
  − φp
 . (8)
2.5 Introducing Child Labor Legislation
Into our simple neoclassical growth model with child labor and human capital
accumulation we now introduce child-labor legislation. We consider two differ-
ent policies aimed at curbing child labor and use the term child-labor legislation
to refer to both policies.
The ﬁrst policy is a ban on child labor. Parents are not allowed to have their chil-
dren do market work, but they still have a decision to make as to what fraction
of children to send to school. The second policy is a mandatory education law
that requires all children to attend school. Under this policy, given that going to
school by assumption requires the full time of a child, parents have no decision
to make with respect to a child’s time allocation.
5Note that L  = g(p ,1 − p ,1 − p ) and K  = k L .
92.5.1 A Ban on Child Labor
Since the laissez-faire equilibrium with none of the restrictions in place is Pareto
efﬁcient, we know that the equilibrium allocation under a child-labor ban is
(weakly) worse from a welfare point of view. Such a policy imposes additional
restrictions on the choice sets of households without correcting any type of mar-
ket failure, which by assumption is absent in the benchmark model. The purpose
of our analysis in this section is merely to determine the effect of such a policy on
equilibrium allocations.
Under a child-labor ban the household decision problem is to maximize (23) sub-
ject to:
ct + at+1 + φpt+1 = ptw
s
t +( 1− pt)w
u
t +( 1+rt)at,
ct ≥ 0,p t+1 ∈ [0,1],
which results in household Euler equations:
u
 (ct)=βu






+ ξt − νt.
Replacing prices with marginal products, the conditions can be written as:
u
 (ct)=βu
 (ct+1)(1 − δ + fK(kt+1)),
φ =
fL(kt+1)[gNs(t +1 ,Nc =0 )− gNu(t +1 ,Nc =0 ) ]
(1 − δ + fK(kt+1))
+ ξt − νt.
The equations characterizing the steady state of the model under a child-labor
ban are:
δ + ρ = fK(k
 ),
1+ρ =










  − φp
 
s. (9)
102.5.2 A Mandatory Education Law
For the same reason as with a child-labor ban, in the current model a mandatory-
education law cannot be welfare improving relative to the laissez-faire equilib-
rium. Now the fraction of children obtaining education is not a choice variable,




 (ct+1)(1 − δ + fK(kt+1)),
and the steady-state equations read as:
δ + ρ = fK(k
 ),
p
  =1 ,
c
  = F(K
 ,1,1,0) − δK
  − φ. (10)
2.6 The Long-Run Consequences of Child Labor Legislation
We now deduce the long-run (that is, steady state) allocational consequences of
child-labor legislation. The ﬁrst result characterizes the effect on child-labor leg-
islation on the capital-labor ratio (and consequently the interest rate):
Proposition 3 The long-run capital-labor ratio k  is not affected by the introduction of
legal restrictions on child labor; neither is the long-run interest rate nor the long-run
price of an efﬁciency unit of labor.
This result is, of course, owed to Condition 1, which rules out features such as
capital-skill complementarity. To make further progress we now make paramet-
ric assumptions on the function g which aggregates labor inputs into effective
units of labor.















11where θ is the share parameter on skilled labor.6 Skilled workers can be used as unskilled
workers, in which case they are κs times as efﬁcient as unskilled workers (whose efﬁ-
ciency we normalize to 1). Children can do unskilled work, and they are κc as efﬁcient as
unskilled adults.
This formulation has the advantage that labor supply L is positive even when
there are no unskilled workers and no child laborers (as is the case in the steady
state with mandatory education). The ﬁrm’s optimal allocation of its skilled
workers is to allocate a fraction








to skilled work and use the remaining 1 − s as unskilled workers. We see that if
skilled agents are not very efﬁcient in doing unskilled work (relative to unskilled
workers and children) or if there are few skilled workers relative to unskilled or
children workers, then it is optimal to make all skilled workers do skilled work.
Otherwise it is optimal to use some skilled workers for unskilled work.
Wenowwanttoinvestigate howthelong-run allocation ofworkers amongskilled
and unskilled (and thus the economy-wide stock of human capital) is affected by
child-labor legislation. Once we have characterized the steady-state fraction p 
of skilled adults, total effective labor supply L , the aggregate capital stock K ,
as well as aggregate consumption c  will follow.
Evidently, under mandatory education we have p  =1 . However, if κs is sufﬁ-
ciently large, even under laissez faire or a child-labor ban every child will receive
education, and steady-state equilibria under all regimes will coincide. To dis-
tinguish the policy regimes, we thus want to establish conditions under which
the laissez-faire steady state and the child-labor ban steady state feature p  < 1.
The benchmark for comparisons is the steady state under mandatory education
where every worker is skilled, the share of skilled workers doing unskilled work
is s = θ, and ratio of wages between skilled and unskilled workers equals κs (the
relative productivity of the skilled workers doing unskilled work).
6We can allow θ =0in which case skilled and unskilled workers areperfect substitutes. But in
this case steady-state equilibria with interior education allocations exist only as knife-edge case.
Thus unless otherwise noted we assume θ>0.
122.6.1 Education Allocation in the Laissez Faire Steady State
In the laissez-faire equilibrium the Euler allocation for education reads as:
1+ρ =
fL(k )[gNs( ) − gNu( )] + (1 + ρ)(ξ  − ν )
φ + fL(k )gNc( )
. (11)
Deﬁne ¯ p  as the threshold share of educated workers below which all skilled









In the appendix we prove the following result:
Proposition 4 Assume that κs ≤ 1.7 Then there exists a unique steady-state share of
skilled workers under laissez faire 0 <p  
LF < ¯ p 
LF < 1. All skilled workers do skilled (as
opposed to unskilled) work, that is, s =1 .
As a straightforward corollary we obtain that the education and skill level of the
work force is strictly higher with a mandatory education law than in the laissez-
faire steady state.











1 − p 
LF











Thus, steady-state wage inequality is strictly higher in the laissez-faire steady state.
7This is a sufﬁcient but by no means necessary condition.
132.6.2 Education Allocation with Child Labor Ban
As in the previous discussion we can now deduce the optimal education alloca-
tion if a child-labor ban is in place. The key Euler equation reads as
1+ρ =
fL(k )[gNs( ,Nc =0 )− gNu( ,Nc =0 ) ]+( 1+ρ)(ξ  − ν )
φ
. (13)
The threshold ¯ p 












This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Assume that κs ≤ 1. Then there exists a unique steady state share of
skilled workers under a child-labor ban 0 <p  
B < ¯ p 
B < 1. All skilled workers do skilled








1 − p 
B




So far we have established that the capital labor-ratio is unaffected by child-labor
legislation. Mandatory education implements higher human capital and lower




Finally, comparing the laissez-faire steady state with that under a child-labor ban
we ﬁnd that a ban on child labor may be counterproductive in that it may lower
the fraction of children obtaining education, that is, p 
B <p  
LF. This may seem
counterintuitive at ﬁrst inspection of (11) and (13). A child-labor ban reduces the
opportunity cost of sending a child to school, since it is legally precluded from
working in the market sector. This cost shows up in the denominator of (11) as
fL(k )gNc( ), which, ceteris paribus, reduces p ,r e l a t i v et o(13).B u tt h e r ei sa l s o
an effect of the child-labor ban on relative wages of skilled versus unskilled adult
workers. A child-labor ban reduces the supply of unskilled labor from children
and therefore makes unskilled labor scarce relative to skilled labor. Thus, the rel-
ative wage of the skilled is lower than without a child-labor ban, which reduces
14incentives to acquire education. These two effects go in opposite directions, and
one can construct examples such that either effect quantitatively dominates.
2.7 Transition Path
So far we have restricted our analysis to a steady state comparison. Since the
ﬁrst welfare theorem holds, the welfare implications of introducing child-labor
legislation are unambiguously negative; a transition analysis is not required to
establish this result. Thinking from a social planner’s perspective also makes
clear that welfare under a mandatory-education law must be weakly lower than
under a child-labor ban, since the mandatory-education allocation is feasible un-
der a child-labor ban, whereas the opposite is not true (the planner can choose
p  < 1 under a child-labor ban). Thus mandatory education imposes additional
restrictions on the social planner, which weakly lowers welfare.
The full dynamics of allocations are hard to characterize analytically since the
model has two state variables, K and p. In the case of a child-labor ban total
current output Y is a sufﬁcient state variable, since it is not affected by the cur-
rent education choice. From the initial condition (K0,p 0) (which could be the
laissez-faire steady state) the dynamics of physical and human capital can then
be characterized by the Bellman equation:
V (Y )=m a x
K ,p  {u(Y − K
  − φp
 )+βV(F(K
 ,g(p
 ,1 − p
 ,0)))}.
While it is hard to obtain clear-cut qualitative results from this recursive formu-
lation (one can show that under mild conditions the evolution of consumption is
monotonic over time), solving this problem numerically is straightforward and
suggests that the evolution of human and physical capital is (weakly) monotonic
as well.
2.8 Distributional Consequences of Child Labor Laws
So far, despite the fact that every representative household has unskilled and
skilled members, the change in relative wages due to the introduction of child-
15labor legislation has no distributional consequences since consumption is per-
fectly insured within the family.
Now assume that the economy starts out at the laissez-faire steady state and all
individuals have the same initial capital. But now relax the assumption of per-
fect consumption insurance and assume instead that there is no insurance at all
amongmembers of theinitial cohort of households (butfull insurancethereafter).
Thus, now there are two types of households, unskilled and skilled, and there-
fore distributional consequences from introduction of child-labor legislation will
arise.
Skilled and unskilled households face the same choice set of consumption and
physical and human capital accumulation, apart from the fact that unskilled in-
dividuals earn lower wages in the current period. Thus the relative welfare con-
sequences of a policy on both groups are fully determined by the impact of the
policy on wages in the initial period.8
Under both a child-labor ban and mandatory education the supply of child labor
is zero, either as required by law or on account of the assumption that children
that go to school cannot work. Thus, given that the skill composition p  ∈ (0, ¯ p 
LF)
and the capital-labor-ratio k  is predetermined, the impact on ﬁrst period wages
of both groups is given by:
Δws = fL(k
 )[gNs(p
 ,1 − p
 ,0) − gNs(p
 ,1 − p





1 − p 
p 
 1−θ





 ,1 − p
 ,0) − gNu(p
 ,1 − p





1 − p 
p 
 −θ
(1 − (1 + κ
c)
−θ) > 0.
Not surprisingly, skilled workers lose from the introduction of child labor while
unskilled workers gain. The reason is that child labor is a perfect substitute for
unskilled labor but only an imperfect substitute for skilled labor in production.
8One can show that as long as the period utility function is homothetic and and education
allocations are interior, aggregate allocations in this variant of the model coincide with that in the
previous section.
16Furthermore, the size of the wage gains and losses (and thus the welfare gains
and losses) depend on the initial skill distribution of society as determined by p .
These results indicate that while the laissez-fare equilibrium is Pareto efﬁcient,
there are groups that can potentially gain from the introduction of child-labor
legislation. Our analysis so far identiﬁes unskilled adults as the prime group for
which this may be true. Even for this group, however, there are opposing effects
(such as the loss of child labor income) that could lead them to oppose child-
labor legislation despite the increase in their wage. We will explore this point
further in Section 4 below, where we examine the political economy of child-
labor restrictions.
2.9 Extensions
We have made several restrictive modeling assumptions in order to obtain sharp
analytical results. We now brieﬂy discuss (rather than formally analyze) two of
what we consider to be the most important extensions.
2.9.1 Home Production
We have assumed that children that go to school cannot work atall and that a ban
on childlaborisperfectlyenforced, sothatchildrenare preventedfrom doingany
work. An important extension would be to explicitly model home production.9
In that case children could be permitted to work after school at home, and one
may assume that a child-labor ban is enforceable in the formal market sector, but
not in the informal home production sector. While a formal analysis of such a
model is beyond the scope of this paper, one may conjecture that the impact of
child-labor legislation on equilibrium allocations isquantitatively smaller in such
a model, because households are given an additional margin of adjustment (how
much to let children work at home) to deal with such legislation.
9For a general treatment of home production in macroeconomics, see Greenwood, Rogerson,
and Wright (1995) and Parente, Rogerson, and Wright (2000).
172.9.2 Model Elements that Generate Multiple Equilibria
There is a substantial literature, pioneered by Basu and Van (1998) and skillfully
summarized in Section 6 of Basu (1999) suggesting that child-labor legislation
may move the economy from a socially undesirable to a socially desirable equi-
librium. Of course such an argument requires a model that features multiple
equilibria, or at least multiple steady states. At the heart of many of these mod-
els is a backward bending family labor supply curve: as wages for (adult) labor
are falling parents may ﬁnd it optimal to increasingly send children to work. An
equilibrium with high child labor and low wages results. If the government im-
poses a ban on child labor, an equilibrium with high wages and no child labor
(and thus increased education and human capital accumulation) ensues. In such
circumstances a ban on child labor can be the ﬁrst-best policy, if indeed the high-
wage equilibrium allocation constitutes the socially optimal allocation and the
ban is costless to enforce.
A potential caveat is that most of the work that stresses the importance of mul-
tiple equilibria employs static models. While it may be feasible to construct
dynamic models with similar features, in our modeling framework the steady-
state equilibrium is unique. In particular, the time discount rate of households
unique determines interest rates, and thus the capital-labor ratio. Since equilib-
rium wages only depend on this ratio, multiple (long-run) equilibria in the labor
market can be ruled out. An unanticipated child-labor ban may still implement
a high-wage equilibrium temporarily, but this would also lower the return to
capital. The capital-labor ratio would then begin to fall, until the original lower
wage is restored. To obtain multiple equilibria in dynamic models one either
has to break the link between time preference rates and interest rates, or the
link from capital-labor ratios to wages. This may be feasible in some skillfully
constructed dynamic model, but in a wide class of models commonly used in
macroeconomics it is not.
183 Potential Rationales for Government Intervention
We now turn to a discussion of models (or better, model elements) that may
provide a normative justiﬁcation for the presence of child-labor legislation. Of
course this requires a model where the welfare theorems fail.
3.1 Human Capital Externalities
Positive externalities in production (or consumption) from a high average level
of education are commonly cited as justiﬁcations for policies trying to enhance
human-capital accumulation in general and child-labor laws in particular. John
Stuart Mill in 1848 already pointed out the potential negative consequences for
society as a whole (in addition to the consequences for individual families) when
children fail to attain proper education.10 A formal analysis of child-labor legisla-
tion in the presence of externalities is contained in Grootaert and Kanbur (1995),
and the quantitative implications of child-labor policies for allocations and wel-
fare in such a model are deduced by Krueger and Donahue (2005). The following
discussion builds on their work.
Introducing a production externality into the previous model is straightforward.
















with ξ>0.H e r e¯ Ns is the number of skilled workers in society, whereas Ns is the
number of skilled workers a given ﬁrm hires. Of course, one could also envision
physical capital externalities or externalities from unskilled labor or child labor
(with a negative sign, presumably), but the main message of this section would
remain the same.11
10See Basu’s (1999) quotation of the original statement made by Mill, p. 1095.
11Models with externalities can have multiple equilibria and multiple steady states if the exter-
nality is sufﬁciently strong. In our theoretical analysis we implicitly assume that ξ is sufﬁciently
small for this not to occur.
19Now solutions to the social planner problem and competitive equilibrium alloca-
tions do not coincide any longer. The Euler equation for capital reads as before,
in both the social plannerproblem aswell asin the competitive equilibrium (with
and without child-labor legislation):
u
 (ct)=βu
 (ct+1)[1− δ + fK(kt+1)].
Now, however, the Euler equation for the education decision (assuming interior-
ity) for the social planner problem reads as
u
 (ct)[φ + fL(kt)gNc(t)] = βu
 (ct+1)fL(kt+1)[gNs(t +1 )+g ¯ Ns(t +1 )− gNu(t +1 ) ],
(15)
while it it is given by
u
 (ct)[φ + fL(kt)gNc(t)] = βu
 (ct+1)fL(kt+1)[gNs(t +1 )− gNu(t +1 ) ] (16)
in the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium. With a ban on child labor we obtain
the decentralized optimality condition (again assuming interiority):
u
 (ct)φ = βu
 (ct+1)fL(kt+1)[gNs(t +1 )− gNu(t +1 ) ], (17)
while mandatory education forces the education allocation to be pt+1 =1 .
Unless ξ =0 , the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium allocation is no longer
Pareto efﬁcient, as a simple comparison between (15) and (16) reveals. In gen-
eral, the competitive equilibrium features too little education relative to the social
optimum. As is well known, efﬁciency could be restored by paying education or
wage subsidies to skilled workers (in the amount of fL(kt+1)g ¯ Ns(t +1 ) ) ﬁnanced
by lump-sum taxes. Child-labor legislation may move the competitive equilib-
rium education allocation towards the social optimum, but it is not obvious a
priori that such a second-best policy is in fact welfare improving.
To obtain sharper analytical results it is again fruitful to investigate steady states.
The steady state capital-labor ratio in the social optimum and in equilibrium (un-
der all policies) satisﬁes
ρ + δ = fK(k
 ),
20and the socially optimal education allocation p 
SO as well as the equilibrium edu-
cation allocations p 
LF, p 
B satisfy, respectively (again assuming interiority):
1+ρ =
gNs(p 
SO)+g ¯ Ns(p 














B,Nc =0 )− gNu(p 
B,Nc =0 ) ]
φ/fL(k )
.
Tedious algebra similar to the one used in proving Propositions 4 to 6 delivers
the following results:
Proposition 7
1. If ξ (or κs) is sufﬁciently large, then p 
SO =1 . In this case a mandatory educa-
tion law implements the socially optimal level of education in the long run. The
long-run education levels in the laissez-faire and child-labor ban equilibria are in-
efﬁciently low, because, as before:
0 <p  
B < ¯ p 
B < 1,
0 <p  
LF < ¯ p 
LF < 1.
2. As long as ξ>0,w eh a v ep 
SO >p  
LF, and thus the long-run education level in the
social optimum is always strictly higher than in the laissez-faire steady state.








but this is true only for a measure zero of the parameter space. That is, a child-labor
ban may accidentally implement the long run socially optimal level of education.








occurs for a positive measure of the parameter space.
21The results of this section can therefore be summarized as follows. With produc-
tion externalities the laissez-faire equilibrium is not socially optimal. If the exter-
nality is sufﬁciently large, a mandatory education law implements the ﬁrst-best
allocation in which everybody gets educated. A child-labor law may acciden-
tally implement the ﬁrst-best allocation (but only if the ﬁrst-best allocation calls
for some agents remaining unskilled).12 Appropriately chosen policies that cor-
rect the externality directly (such as an education subsidy or a wage subsidy for
the skilled) can always implement the ﬁrst best allocation.13
3.2 Borrowing Constraints
In the previous model parents could borrow to pay the cost of education φ for
their children. As demonstrated nicely in a two-period model by Baland and
Robinson (2000), if households face borrowing constraints of the form
at+1 ≥ 0
and if these constraints are binding, education and human capital accumulation
may be inefﬁciently low and child labor inefﬁciently high.14 Parents desiring to
borrow (but unable to do so) in order to ﬁnance current consumption or the cost
of schooling may call upon their children to provide additional income for the
family in excess of what is socially optimal.
Wecan make this point formally in our modelby contemplating the following ex-
12There are three effects that have to cancel each other out exactly. First, with a child-labor
ban the opportunity cost of going to school is lowered, since the foregone production of children
is not taken into account by households. Second, the reduction of unskilled labor relative to
skilled labor changes the relative marginal product of skilled and unskilled. Both these effects
were present before. A third effect comes from the externality: higher education leads to higher
societal human capital and thus shifts the production function upwards, an effect that is not
internalized in the competitive equilibrium with a child-labor ban (or without a child-labor ban,
for that matter).
13Along similar lines, Dessyand Pallage(2005)point outthatevenwhen educationisdesirable,
banning child labor can be counterproductive, as it robs poor families of the resources needed to
acquire at least some education for their children.
14In addition to the large literature in macroeconomics that routinely imposes borrowing con-
straints on households, in the context of studies of child labor this assumption has been used,
among others, by Ranjan (2001), Dessy and Pallage (2001), and Krueger and Donahue (2005).
22tension. Impose borrowing constraints on a household of measure zero, so that
equilibrium prices and aggregate quantities remain unchanged.15 In an equilib-








which states that the gross return on physical and human capital are equalized.
Now suppose that the borrowing constraint of our atomless household at date t
binds.16 Then that household’s optimality conditions read as17
u
 (ct) >β u
 (ct+1)(1 + rt+1), (19)
u













where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint pt+1 ≥ 0; the constraint
pt+1 ≤ 1 can be ignored for what follows. Consolidating equations (19) and
(20) and using (18) implies that ξt > 0,a n dt h u spt+1 =0 .P r e v i o u s l y , i n t h e
absence of the borrowing constraint, the household had sent pt+1 > 0 children to
school like everybody else in the economy (and what the social planner would
have mandated as well), but with a binding borrowing constraint it is optimal to
increase market work for the household’s children to alleviate the constraint.18
While the previous argument demonstrates that in the presence of binding bor-
rowing constraints the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefﬁcient, it is less clear that
child-labor legislation leads to a Pareto improvement. In fact, absent general
equilibrium price effects our atomless household is evidently worse of if pre-
ventedfrom sendingherchildrentoworkbyeitherachild-laborbanoramandatory-
15Of course this is our thinly veiled attempt to ignore the general equilibrium price effects from
the imposition of borrowing constraints.
16Of course this is a choice of the household. This choice may be optimal, e.g. at time t =1
if the household comes into the period with no assets because it had initial condition a0 =0 .
Rather than providing restrictions on exogenous parameters that make this choice optimal, for
simplicity we assume it here and deduce the consequences of this assumption.
17We focus on the case where we do not have a false corner: the Lagrange multiplier on the
borrowing constraint is assumed to be strictly positive.
18It is straightforward to obtain a more continuous, but qualitatively similar response of child
labor to binding borrowing constraints by either introducing home production for children with
decreasing marginal products or a human capital accumulation equation with decreasing mar-
ginal returns, as in, for example, Baland and Robinson (2000).
23education law.19 Again, direct policies to alleviate the effects of these borrowing
constraints appear to be preferable.20
3.3 Imperfect Altruism
If the social planner (or the government) values children more in its social wel-
fare function than parents do, child labor allocations chosen by parents for their
children may be inefﬁcient from the perspective of society.21
In our modeling framework this point can be made in a simple fashion. Again









where ρSP <ρis the social time discount factor. From the steady state capital





δ + ρ = fK(k
 ),
and thus k 
SP >k   and fL(k 
SP) >f L(k ). Intuitively, since the social planner val-
ues future generations more than private households she mandates more capital
accumulation.
Analogous to Section 2.6, under weak conditions we can show that in the steady
state of the social optimum and the laissez-faire equilibrium education decisions
19The introduction of child-labor legislation for everybody evidently will have general equilib-
rium price effects,and a Paretoranking of the laissez-faireequilibrium andthe equilibrium under
the child labor policy is not straightforward in the model with borrowing constraints.
20One has to be cautious here since such obvious policies as income or wealth transfers to the
poor may create other distortions due to the need to generate tax revenues, and due to adverse
incentive effects in models with private information or moral hazard.
21For this argument it is not necessary that parents do not love their children at all; all that is
needed is that they love them less than what is implied by the social welfare function. A related
rationale for child-labor legislation, especially mandatory schooling laws, arises if parents suffer
from a commitment problem for sending their children to school. See Dessy and Knowles (2001)
for an analysis.














[gNs(p ) − gNu(p )]
φ/fL(k )+gNc(p )
. (22)
The right-hand sides (the societal and market return to education) is strictly de-
creasing in pSP and p  (in their relevant range) respectively, and for any p =
pSP = p  the right-hand side of (21) is larger than the right-hand side of (22).
Since the left-hand side of (21) is smaller than the left-hand side of (22),w eﬁ n d
that pSP >p  , that is, the social planner chooses strictly more education and less
child labor than implied by the laissez-faire equilibrium. Using the results from
Section 2.6 then implies that a ban on child labor may accidentally implement
the efﬁcient long-run education and child labor allocation. This, however, is an
unlikely event, as it occurs only on measure zero of the parameter space. Since
pSP < 1, it remains true that (under the assumptions maintained in Section 2.6)
mandatory education leads to overaccumulation of human capital in the long
run. As before, more direct policies than child-labor legislation are available to
implement the socially optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium.22
3.4 Imperfect Insurance Markets
Another model element that may render the competitive equilibrium Pareto in-
efﬁcient is uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, for example with respect to the health
or earnings capacity of parents. In this case child labor, in the absence of formal
insurance markets, may act asa source of informal insurance within the family, at
least if the child’s earnings opportunities are not perfectly correlated with those
of the parent that faces the original risk.
Equilibria in modelswith uninsurable idiosyncratic risk are notPareto efﬁcientin
general, since the social planner can diversify idiosyncratic risk whereas house-
holds cannot. But in these models child labor has a positive role for intra-family
22A direct policy that leads to an equilibrium which is ﬁrst best now requires a subsidy both to
human and physical capital accumulation, again ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.
25risk sharing (see also Grootaert and Kanbur 1995).23 Thus policies designed to
curb child labor, such as a child-labor ban or a mandatory education law may
be welfare reducing unless other model elements providing a rationale for such
legislation are present. If the government aims at reducing child labor without
the potentially adverse effects on intra-family risk sharing, it should deal with
the source of child labor directly and provide government-sponsored insurance
against idiosyncratic income risk of parents.24
4 Political Economy of Child Labor Legislation
We have argued in the preceding sections that from a social welfare perspec-
tive, child-labor restrictions are often suboptimal, even when there exist frictions
that render the market equilibrium inefﬁcient. Nevertheless, in the real world
most countries have adopted child labor regulations, and political support for
these restrictions is strong. In this section, we address these observations from a
political-economy perspective. In particular, we focus on possible reasons why
socially suboptimal policies may persist in the political process.
4.1 General Issues
We will restrict the set of available policies to laissez faire and a child-labor ban.
To determine which of these options is politically viable, we have to specify a po-
litical mechanism (such as majority voting). Before going into the details, how-
ever, it is instructive to discuss political support for child-labor restrictions at
a more general level. For child labor to be chosen in any political mechanism,
there has to be a constituency in favor of the ban (the mechanism then merely de-
termines whether the constituency has sufﬁcient power to enforce its preferred
policy choice). The ﬁrst question then becomes which group in our theoretical
framework stands to gain (at least potentially) from child-labor restrictions.
23Krueger and Donohue’s (2005) quantitative model includes parental labor income risk and
demonstrates the importance of child labor as an intra-family insurance mechanism.
24Of course this simple policy prescription is only valid if the well-known moral hazard prob-
lems in providing public income insurance are negligible.
26Return for now to our baseline model without externalities or market imperfec-
tions. For a homogeneous population, we have already determined that nobody
stands to gain from restricting child labor, as in this case the social welfare func-
tion is identical to each person’s utility function. A heterogeneous population
is thus a necessary condition for political support for child-labor restrictions. In
particular, consider the case of a population that is heterogeneous in terms of fac-
tor endowments, as in our discussion of separate skilled and unskilled groups
in Section 2.8 above. Child-labor restrictions affect these groups through two
different channels. First, there is a direct impact on the choices of each house-
hold. For households that otherwise would have engaged in child labor, a ban
implies a loss of family income and possibly additional schooling costs. For ra-
tional households, a smaller choice set is never a good thing, so the direct effect
cannot lead any type of household to support a child-labor ban.
The situation is different with the second channel. Restricting child labor affects
the overall supply of unskilled labor, and thus factor prices. In particular, house-
holds whose factors of production are complementary to child labor stand to lose
from a restriction in child labor, as the returns to their factor will decline. Given
our choice of production function, capital is complementary to aggregate labor
supply. Thus ceteris paribus restricting child labor will lower the return to capital,
so that “capitalists” (i.e., a hypothetical households who supplies only capital but
no labor) should be opposed to any restrictions. In contrast, those who supply
factors substitutable with child labor stand to gain. In our model, this group con-
sists of workers who compete with children in the labor market. If child labor is
restricted, their wages will increase.
Thus, we identify the drive to limit competition as a potential motive of those
who support child-labor restrictions. In this sense, it may appear that the politi-
cal economy of child-labor restrictions is similar to that of other types of legisla-
tion such as immigration laws (which limit labor-market competition provided
by foreigners) or union privileges (which allow unions to limit competition pro-
vided by outsiders). However, in these other examples the motives of those sup-
porting the policy are less ambiguous, because the potential competitors do not
enter their own utility function. A key difference between child-labor restric-
27tions and other forms of labor legislation is that in the case of child labor, the
competition may be coming (at least partially) from within the own family. Thus,
whether a given group favors child-labor restrictions will depend both on the
complementarity of their skill and factor endowments with child labor, and on
the extent to which their own family income is dependent on child labor.
4.2 A Simpliﬁed Model
Analyzing these trade-offs in our general setup is fairly complicated. To form po-
litical preferences, voters have to evaluate the consequences of the different eco-
nomic equilibria corresponding to each policy. In a dynamic setting, the conse-
quences of today’s political and economic decisions for future political outcomes
also have to be taken into account. These complications make it difﬁcult to an-
alyze the political economy of child-labor laws without relying on numerical re-
sults. Nevertheless, the basic trade-offs that are involved here can be highlighted
by using a simpliﬁed version of our model and restricting attention to a simple
political framework with a one-time vote on child-labor laws. More speciﬁcally,
in the initial period there is a referendum on the introduction of a permanent
child-labor ban. If the ban is adopted, it is put in place permanently; if the ref-
erendum is rejected, there will be no further votes in the future. The measure
is adopted if a majority of voters (the current adults) favors it. We simplify the
economic model by making the following assumptions: the production function
is Cobb-Douglas in skilled and unskilled labor (which includes child labor), and
physical capital does not enter production; there is a market imperfection that
prevents borrowing and lending across generations; the utility function is linear;
and there is no direct cost of education (φ =0 ; of course the opportunity cost
due to lost child-labor income is still present). This simple environment will be
sufﬁcient to demonstrate the main trade-offs; we will discuss the implications of
more realistic settings (dynamic voting etc.) later on. The decision problem of








28where the maximization is subject to:
ct = ptw
s
t +( 1− pt)w
u
t +( 1− pt+1)w
c
t,
ct ≥ 0,p t+1 ∈ [0,1].

















where κc is the productivity of a child relative to an unskilled adult. The only
choice for the household is the fraction pt+1 of children to be educated.
4.2.1 The Laissez-faire Steady State
We assume that the economy is initially (i.e., at the time of the referendum) in
the laissez-faire steady state where child labor is legal. Under laissez faire, the













In equilibrium, this ﬁrst-order condition has to hold with equality because both
skilled and unskilled labor are essential for production, implying 0 <p t < 1.
Plugging in the wages as a function of labor supplies in each periods, the opti-





























29In the laissez-faire steady state, this equation can be expressed as a function of
the fraction p 



























The left-hand side is strictly increasing in p 
LF, whereas the right-hand side is
strictly decreasing and moving from +∞ to −∞ as p 
LF varies from 0 to 1,i m p l y -
ing that there is a unique steady-state p 





(β + κc)(1 − θ)+( 1+κc)βθ
.



























4.2.2 The Child-Labor Ban Steady State
In the referendum, the electorate considers a proposal to ban child labor per-
manently, with no possibility of a future reversal to the laissez-faire policy. The
referendum takes place before households have to choose the fraction p of their
children to be educated. If the resolution is passed, transition to the new steady
state is immediate. We will now characterize this steady state, and then use this
characterization later on to infer voter’s preferences regarding the policy pro-
posal.
In terms of the optimality conditions, adopting a child-labor law is equivalent
to setting the parameter κc to zero. In this case, the economy will immediately
































Notice that since introducing a child-labor ban reduces the opportunity cost of
education to zero, in this steady state p 
B is such that the skilled and the un-
skilled wage are identical. Notice also that there are no transitional dynamics
in that convergence to the ste a d ys t a t ei si m m e d i a t e( u n l e s si nt h ei n i t i a lp e r i o d
the education decision is ﬁxed irreversibly before the vote is passed, in which
case the steady state is reached in two periods). That is different when there is
no child-labor law, because the opportunity cost of education (given by the chil-
dren’s wage) can vary along the transition path.
4.2.3 The Political Equilibrium
We now deﬁne a majority-voting equilibrium for a one-time referendum over a
child-labor ban more formally.
Deﬁnition 4 (Political Equilibrium for One-Time Referendum) A political equi-
librium is a policy (either “laissez-faire” or “child-labor ban”) together with a set of indi-
vidual and aggregate economic variables such that:
1. Conditional on the policy being put permanently into place, the economic variables
formanequilibriumasdeﬁnedabove,withthelaissez-fairesteadystate astheinitial
condition.
2. For at least 50 percent of the population, utility under the chosen policy is no lower
than under the alternative policy.
31Existence of such a political equilibrium is immediate, since we already showed
the existence of the economic equilibria corresponding to each policy. Thus each
voter’s utility under each policy is well deﬁned, so that one of the policy must
gather at least 50 percent support.
So far, we have not speciﬁed whether the population is initially homogeneous
(i.e., families consisting of fraction p 
LF and 1−p 
LF of skilled and unskilled work-
ers, with full insurance within the family), or heterogeneous in terms of skill as in
Section 2.8 above (the steady state analysis is valid for either case). However, we
already know that in a homogeneous population there would be no support for a
child-labor ban because it lowers social welfare, which in this case is identical to
personal utility.25 We therefore proceed by considering different types of hetero-
geneity in the initial population (while continuing to assume that the fractions of
skilled and unskilled people are given by the laissez-faire steady state).
4.3 Political Preferences of Skilled and Unskilled Workers
Let us consider a situation where skilled and unskilled people are each on their
own, rather than forming part of a family that provides insurance. To infer the
political preferences of these two groups, we have to compute their lifetime util-
ities under each policy. In our simpliﬁed model environment, this is a straight-
forward exercise. In the period when the ban is passed, households are affected
through changing wages in response to the lower supply of unskilled labor. In
addition, the families that were planning to send their children to work suffer a
loss of child-labor income. Starting from the following period, the economy will
be in the new steady state corresponding to a child-labor ban, so that the utility
gap to the status quo can be easily inferred.
We will start out by considering the impact on skilled and unskilled workers’
utility in the initial period. To simplify notation, without loss of generality we
compute utilities under the assumption that in the laissez-faire steady state all
of the skilled and none of the unskilled parents educate their children (i.e., only
25The First Welfare Theorem still applies despite the absence of a capital market because of the
linear utility function.
32children of unskilled parents work).26 Given this assumption, if the laissez-faire































































Notice that the impact-period wages are not identical to the steady-state wages
ws 
B and wu 
B , because the relative supplyof skilled and unskilled labor adjust only
in the following period (the fraction of skilled is still p 
LF rather than p 
B). For the







(1 + κc)1−θ < 1.
Thus, despite not engaging in child labor, the skilled suffer from a child-labor
ban through lower wages. For the unskilled, the ratio of initial utilities under the









(1 + κc)1−θ < 1. (25)
Thus, even for the unskilled rejecting the child-labor ban yields higher initial util-
ity. The unskilled gain in the form of higher wages, but they also lose child-labor
income. Due to diminishing returns (θ<1), the unskilled wage changes less than
26This does not violate optimization because of linear utility: everyone, regardless of income,
is indifferent between educating and not educating their children. For expositional purposes, it
is useful to focus on the status quo where the children of the unskilled work, also because this is
the relevant case in the data (i.e., child labor rates generally decrease in parental income).
33proportionally with the supply of unskilled labor. Given that the relative decline
in each family’s labor supply is equal to t h er e l a t i v ed e c l i n eo fa g g r e g a t el a b o r
supply, this implies that the wage gain cannot make up for the income loss.
So far, we have found that at least initially, both skilled and unskilled workers
would suffer from the introduction of a child-labor ban. However, this ﬁnding is
not sufﬁcient to determine political preferences, because the long-run impact of
the ban alsoneeds to be taken into account. If the ban is passed, in the subsequent
period the economy reaches a new steady state where the skilled and unskilled
wages are equal and given by (24). Using these future wages, we can compute
the full lifetime impact of the introduction of the ban. For skilled workers, the




































 1−θ < 1.
Thus, the skilled are unambiguously opposed to the introduction of a child-labor
ban. Due to lower skilled wages, both the short- and the long-run effect are neg-


















(1 − β)(1 + κc)θβθ + β(β + κc)θ
(1 + κc)βθ
=
(1 − β)(1 + κc)θ + β(1 + κc/β)θ
1+κc .
This ratio can be smaller or larger than one, depending on parameters. In par-
ticular, the unskilled will gain from an introduction of a child-labor ban if the
34parameter θ is sufﬁciently close to one. Intuitively, a large θ implies that the
unskilled wage is highly elastic with respect to unskilled labor supply. We saw
earlier that in the short run, even with a large θ the wage increase for unskilled
w o r k e r sd o e sn o tm a k eu pf o rt h el o s tc h ild-labor income. In the long run, how-
ever, the unskilled wage increases even more than in the impact period, due to
a higher relative supply of skilled workers. If this effect is sufﬁciently large, un-
skilled workers stand to gain from the introduction of a ban in terms of lifetime
utility. In this case the unskilled would vote in favor of the ban, and if the un-
skilled also form the majority of the population, the child-labor ban is a political
equilibrium.
Uptothispoint, wehaveidentiﬁedunskilledworkersasthe potentialconstituency
behind the introduction of a child-labor ban. If the unskilled wage is sufﬁciently
elastic with respect to the supply of child labor, these workers stand to gain from
the introduction of a ban and thus would politically support it. In Section 3, we
discussed a number of potential justiﬁcations for child-labor restrictions from a
social perspective, and found that in most cases another, more targeted policy is
more appropriate than a child-labor ban for addressing a social inefﬁciency. It is
worth pointing out that from a political-economy perspective, there is no such
alternative, even-more-appealing policy. As far as the unskilled workers are con-
cerned, competition from children in the labor market is the heart of the problem,
thus banning child labor is exactly what they want to do.
In summary, the results suggests that the political-economy approach has some
merits in terms of explaining the widespread presence of child-labor restrictions
in countries around the world. Nevertheless, the analysis carried out so far has
a number of shortcomings which might call the results into question. First of all,
we found that if unskilled workers support restrictions at all, their gains would
be realized only in the long term. One might question whether uncertain future
gains (which might be further mitigated by general-equilibrium effects through
capital accumulation that oursimplemodel abstracts from) are sufﬁcient tocreate
strong political support for restrictions in the face of short-term losses. Second,
we so far have focused on a political setup with a one-time referendum. One
might question whether a child-labor ban would hold up if, as in reality, repeated
35voting on the same issue were possible. Wewill now addresssome of these issues
in a number of modiﬁcations of our basic framework.
4.4 Dependency on Child Labor Political Support for a Ban
Up to this point, political support for child-labor legislation emerges as a possi-
ble but somewhat unlikely scenario. Only the unskilled (those competing with
c h i l d r e ni nt h el a b o rm a r k e t )c a nb ei nf a v o ri np r i n c i p l e ,a n de v e nt h e yg a i no n l y
in the long run and only if the unskilled wage is sufﬁciently elastic. Stronger po-
litical support for a child-labor ban can arise if there is additional heterogeneity
within the group of the unskilled. In particular, the natural constituency for a
child-labor ban consists of unskilled workers whose families do not rely on child
labor themselves.
Consider a variant of our basic model where becoming skilled not only requires
education, but also a high level of ability. Each workers has a child which is ei-
ther of high or low ability, where the fraction of high-ability children is ¯ p.S i n c e
low-ability children cannot become skilled, they work for sure. If the fraction of
high-ability children is low, ¯ p<p  
LF, the parents of high-ability children strictly
prefer to educate their children. The fraction of skilled in the population is then
given by ¯ p, regardless of whether a child-labor ban is in place. Let us now con-
sider the incentives of an unskilled parent with a high-ability child regarding a
child-labor ban, provided that currently the economy is in the laissez-faire steady
state. Given that the fraction of adult skilled workers is ﬁxed at ¯ p, the skilled and
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36Under the assumption that the realization of ability is independent over time,
in the long run each dynasty is skilled with probability ¯ p and unskilled with
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Thus, in the long-run laissez faire yields higher utility, due to higher expected
output when children are allowed to work. In the short run, however, unskilled
workerswith high-abilitychildrengainunambiguously from introducing achild-













If the weight on current utility is sufﬁciently large (i.e., the discount factor β is
small), unskilledworkers with high-ability childrenwill supportthe introduction
of the ban.27
To put it more generally, unskilled workers usually have an incentive to prevent
other people’s children from working, but this does not necessarily translate into
strong political support for a ban as long as the workers’ own children are work-
ing as well. In an environment where almost all children are at work (which was
true for most countries until after the Industrial Revolution), we would not ex-
pect to see much support for a ban. In contrast, once sufﬁciently many families
abandon child labor in favor of an alternative such as education, political pres-
sure for introducing a child-labor ban is likely to rise. This feature accords well
with the observation that in Western countries, the introduction of comprehen-
sive child-labor restrictions closely followed a rapidly expansion of schooling
levels in the population. Moreover, the theory predicts that the battle over the
introduction of a ban is fought to large extent between different groups of un-
27However, these workers will generally not form a majority, so that the child-labor ban is
not a political equilibrium in the sense of Deﬁnition 4. To explain the adoption of a ban in this
framework one would need to use a political setup where motivated special-interest groups can
successfully lobby for the passing of legislation even when they are not in the majority.
37skilled workers, those with working children and those without. Consistent with
this prediction, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) and Krueger and Donahue (2005)
document that in the cases of the U.S. and Britain, political pressure in favor of
restrictions came to a large extent from labor unions. The restrictions were op-
posed by capitalists and the business interest, but also by poor families whose
livelihood depended on child-labor income.
4.5 Repeated Voting and Policy Persistence
Our political-economy framework is so far restricted to a one-time referendum in
which voters can once-and-for-all put a child-labor ban into place. In real-world
political systems, however, votes on the same issue can be carried out at different
times, and previous decisions can be reversed. While a fully dynamic political-
economic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, a few of the issues that arise
in this context can be addressed in our framework.
Let us ﬁrst consider the question whether a child-labor ban, once passed into
law, would be likely to persist in the future if another possibility for a referen-
dum opened up. Let us thus assume that the model parameters are such that in
the laissez-faire steady state the unskilled form a majority of the electorate and
favor the introduction of a ban. Consequently, the ban is passed and the econ-
omy switches to the child-labor-ban steady state. If now the issue was opened
to a (previously unexpected) second referendum, would the unskilled still vote
in favor of the ban? Compared to the initial referendum, the situation is now
reversed. The long-run (steady state) utility comparison does not change. Thus,
if the unskilled previously were able to increase their steady-state utility by in-
troducing a ban, abandoning the ban later on would entail a loss in long-term
utility by the same amount. Hence, the long-term incentives still favor the child-
labor ban. The short-run incentives also reverse: In terms of initial utility, the
unskilled would gain if they return to laissez faire through increased family in-
come. The size of this gain, however, is now larger that the initial utility loss that
the unskilled suffered when the ban was ﬁrst introduced. The reason is that in
the child-labor ban steady state, unskilled wages are higher than in the original
38laissez-faire steady state, which makes child labor more attractive. The ratio of
initial utilities under the ban and under laissez faire is still given by (25), but with
the higher level of unskilled wages and utilities this ratio now translates into a
larger absolute utility loss.
In summary, after the child-labor ban is passed initially, the strength of political
support for the ban is likely to diminish over time.28 The main long-run conse-
quence of a child-labor ban is an increase of the unskilled relative to the skilled
wage. It is exactly this higher unskilled wage which increases the attraction of
child labor, and lowers the appeal of the ban. Whether this effect is large enough
to lead to a reversal of the initial policy decision depends on model parameters.
At a minimum, however, the ﬁnding suggests that it might be difﬁcult to sustain
political support for a child-labor ban in the long term. The empirical evidence,
however, does not seem to support this conclusion. There are very few examples
of reversals in child-labor legislation. In most countries and periods, child-labor
legislation has persisted and, if anything, become more stringent over time.
The disparity between model and data raises the question whether additional
features not present in our simple model may be able to account for the per-
sistence of child-labor policies. One such feature is proposed by Doepke and
Zilibotti (2005) who analyze child-labor legislation in a model with endogenous
fertility choice. Fertility, education, and child-labor decisions interact; in particu-
lar, parents who plan to educate their children choose a small family size, while
parents who plan to send their children to work have many children in order to
maximize child-labor income. Fertility decisions are made at the beginning of
adulthood. The irreversible nature of these fertility decisions leads to persistence
in political preferences over child-labor legislation. Consider, for example, the
incentives of an unskilled family when a child-labor ban is in place. Given the
ban, the family will optimally plan to educate their children, and thus choose
a small number of children. If now the possibility of abandoning the ban arises,
this family has little to gain, since with a small number of children potential child
labor income is small. In contrast, if child labor had initially been legal, the fam-
ily would have chosen to have more children, and thus would have become more
28For a full analysis transitional dynamics also need to be considered, but this does not alter
the direction of the change.
39dependent on child labor. The end result is that the political preferences of the
family are likely to favor the status quo. This type of status-quo bias often arises
in a political-economy environment when voters make irreversible decisions that
are optimal given the current policy regime, but suboptimal under some alterna-
tive policy. In the case of child labor, the lock-in effect is likely to be particularly
strong, as the impact of fertility and education decisions on a family’s economic
incentives are large and long lived.29
4.6 Discussion
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that the political-economy approach
can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of child-labor restric-
tions. When we discussed social inefﬁciencies of the laissez-faire equilibrium in
Section 3, we found that while a child-labor ban can be welfare-improving in cer-
tain circumstances, usually other policies exist that do even better. In contrast,
in our political-economy analysis a child-labor ban is exactly what is desired by
those who stand to gain from it. The main conclusion from the analysis is that po-
litical pressure for the introduction of child-labor legislation should stem mostly
from voters who compete with children in the labor market, while not relying
on child-labor income themselves. This conclusion is consistent with the major
role played by labor unions in campaigning for child-labor restrictions in many
countries, as well as the rise of child-labor restrictions just when education lev-
els started to rise, implying that at least some families became less dependent on
child labor income.
Throughout our analysis, we assumed that children and unskilled adults com-
pete in the labor market. It is straightforward to show that with an alternative
production setup where child labor is complementary to adult labor, there won’t
be any support for a child-labor ban. Moreover, if children perform different
tasks, only some of which are in competition with adult labor, we would expect
political pressure for a ban on only those activities where children and adults
29There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the interaction of child labor, fertility,
and education; see Berdugo and Hazan (2002) and Doepke (2004) for macroeconomic analyses of
the long-run growth implications of the child-labor-fertility tradeoff.
40compete. Consistent with this prediction, in many countries child-labor restric-
tions refer explicitly to employment of children in industry and services, while
excepting agriculture from the ban. The political economy view can rationalize
this pattern by assuming, realistically for many countries, that agriculture is a
family-based activity where adults and children engage in different and comple-
mentary tasks, whereas there is more direct competition between adults and chil-
dren for formal employment in industry and services. In contrast, if child labor
were ruled out to improve social efﬁciency in the face of human-capital external-
ities or incomplete ﬁnancial markets, there would be no obvious justiﬁcation for
a sector-speciﬁc ban.
We abstracted from a number of additional factors that could plausibly also play
an important role in the political economy of child-labor legislation. Humani-
tarian concern for the working conditions of children clearly played a role in a
number of campaigns for child-labor legislation, although union pressure was
probably more important on the whole (see the discussion in Doepke and Zili-
botti 2005). We also did not consider the interests of groups other than skilled
or unskilled workers, such capitalists or landowners. A topic that has received
a lot of attention lately is international pressure for child-labor restrictions. To
some extent, this happens through international organizations such as the ILO.
Recently, however, there has been an increasing number of campaigns directed
at consumers in developed countries, with the aim of boycotting products man-
ufactured in developing countries using child labor. The origins and effects of
such phenomena are beyond the scope of our analysis.30
5 Conclusions
While child-labor laws enjoy strong support among politicians around the world
their popularity among economists is limited. In this paper we have, within the
context of various extensions of the neoclassical growth model, identiﬁed con-
30For adiscussionof someof theinternationalaspectsofchild-laborlegislation, seeBasu(1999),
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005b), Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005a) and Pallage and Zimmermann
(2005).
41ditions under which such legislation is not, and conditions under which such
legislation may be desirable. Since we came to the conclusion that child-labor
legislation tends to be at most a substitute for more direct policies addressing
the underlying economic problem generating child labor we then delved into the
realm of political economics to explain the persistence of child-labor legislation.
Indeed, we found that if children and adults compete in the labor market, adult
workers have an incentive to lobby for the abolition of child labor. This incen-
tive will be especially powerful for workers who face labor-market competition
from children, but do not rely on child labor income in their own family. The
political-economy approach can account for a number of features of real-world
child-labor legislation, such as the widespread introduction of restrictions right
after an expansion of education lessened dependency on child labor income, and
the fact that restrictions usually extend only to formal employment, but not to
child labor in the context of traditional family-based agriculture.
Analternative explanation for why child-labor lawsabound isthat itispolitically
advantageous for politicians to impose them, and it is inconsequential for the
economy if these laws are not enforced effectively. We have ignored the issue of
law enforcement altogether here, always implicitly assuming that enforcement of
child-labor legislation is perfect. In addition to developing the political-economy
approach to child-labor legislation further, we view the enforcement issue as a
fruitful ﬁeld for future research.
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44A Optimal Education Allocation in the Laissez Faire
Steady State
For a given k  deﬁne
Γ(p
 )=
gNs(p ) − gNu(p )
φ/fL(k )+gNc(p )
.
We now show that under the assumption κs ≤ 1 we have that Γ(p ) tends to ∞
as p  → 0,t h a tΓ(p  ≥ ¯ p ) ≤ 0 and constant and that Γ(p ) is continuous. Here ¯ p 
is the threshold share of educated workers below which all skilled workers are
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since some skilled workers work as unskilled and their marginal product as un-









(κs(1 − s)p  +( κc + 1)(1 − p ))
sp 


















Consequently, under the assumption that κs ≤ 1 we ﬁnd that Γ(p ) is constant in
p  and nonpositive for p  ≥ ¯ p ,w h e r e a sf o rp  < ¯ p  we ﬁnd that Γ(p ) is strictly
decreasing in p  since gNs is strictly decreasing in p  and gNu,g Nc are strictly in-
46creasing in p . Furthermore it is straightforward to see from the expressions for




and that Γ(p ) is continuous in (0,1].
B Optimal Education Allocation with a Child-Labor
Ban
In general we now have
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47For p  < ¯ p  we have s =1and thus
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and thus we obtain the same qualitative statements as for the laissez-faire steady
state.
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